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ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s gay marriage decision in Obergefell has been 
hailed in almost all corners as a milestone in American jurisprudence. 
From topics as varied as adoption and taxes, a myriad of rights have now 
descended upon gay couples as a result of the Court’s ruling. In this 
Commentary, we explore the little discussed downsides of the decision 
when it comes to the property rights and debts of the spouses. This is 
particularly important when considering the rights of third parties and 
their settled expectations in the context of retroactivity, as well the ways in 
which the Court’s decision may have the undesirable affect of undoing the 
carefully laid plans of the spouses. We conclude that courts and 
legislatures have by no means seen the end of the gay marriage debate. 
Rather, a host of unforeseen collateral issues lies on the horizon. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges 
has received much acclaim.
1
 It has brought a sense of dignity and pride to 
 
 
   Interim Associate Dean for Academic and Student Affairs, Donna W. Lee Professor of 
Family Law, and C.E. Laborde, Jr. Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. 
   Assistant Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center; Fellow, American Bar 
Association Section on Real Property, Trust & Estate Law. 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Obergefell resulted from the consolidation of six cases decided by 
the lower federal appellate courts and brought by a host of plaintiffs, including fourteen gay couples, 
their children, a widower (James Obergefell), and others. Id. at 2594–95. At the time the case was 
decided, all federal circuit courts to have been faced with the issue—those being the Fourth, Seventh, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits—had struck down state law bans on gay marriage, except for the Sixth 
Circuit, which upheld the bans. See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 
766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 
1070 (10th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014). This divergence among the 
federal circuit courts ultimately made the Supreme Court’s involvement inevitable. After much 
anticipation, on June 26, 2015, the Court struck down all state law prohibitions on same-sex marriage 
as violative of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Constitution of the United States. 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05. By the time of Obergefell, thirty-six states and the District of 
Columbia had already legalized same-sex marriage. See Nina Totenberg, Legal Battle over Gay 
Marriage Hits the Supreme Court Tuesday, NPR (Apr. 27, 2015, 5:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/ 
sections/itsallpolitics/2015/04/27/402456198/legal-battle-over-gay-marriage-hits-the-supreme-court-
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gay couples and their families, and a feeling of justice and equality to the 
hearts of many Americans. Not only can gay couples now marry, but they 
also enjoy a host of civil benefits flowing from this age-old institution. 
Same-sex spouses now have the same rights as heterosexual couples with 
regard to estate and income taxation, employment-related spousal benefits, 
and rights of survivorship. Gay spouses should also now be able to adopt 
children and enjoy the various rights and benefits that are appurtenant to 
parenthood. The Court’s decision, and these consequences, have been 
widely celebrated from almost all corners, and in the days following the 
decision, a simple flip through any newspaper or a quick scroll through 
one’s Facebook or Twitter feed revealed a host of celebratory messages, 
supportive editorials, and rainbow-colored profile pictures.  
Still, not all aspects of the decision have been viewed as positive. 
Critics noted the decision’s possible impact on religious freedom, the role 
of the states versus the federal government in the formulation of family 
law, and the extent to which many religious-based educational institutions 
will retain their preferential tax treatment.
2
 One impacted area that has 
received little attention, however, is the law of property. Although perhaps 
less obvious, the Court’s decision will have significant effects with regard 
not only to the traditional property of gay spouses—such as real estate, 
household items, and personal effects—but also to property rights in each 
spouse’s earnings and debts. Moreover, the decision leaves open the 
possibility that the rights of third parties such as buyers, mortgagees, and 
transferees of the property of either spouse might unwittingly suffer a 
significant loss due to the operation of community and other matrimonial 
property rules. Lastly, gay spouses themselves might be surprised to find 
that the legal sanctioning of their unions has inured, in large part, to the 
benefit of their creditors. 
This Commentary ruminates on the little-considered problem of 
property rights arising in connection with gay marriage. While certainly a 
milestone in the story of civil rights in America, the Court’s decision has 
 
 
tuesday; The Changing Landscape of Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/same-sex-marriage/ (showing all states where 
same-sex marriage was legal prior to Obergefell being decided). 
 2. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein & Adam Liptak, Schools Fear Gay Marriage Ruling Could End 
Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/us/schools-fear-
impact-of-gay-marriage-ruling-on-tax-status.html; Emma Green, Gay Rights May Come at the Cost of 
Religious Freedom, THE ATLANTIC (July 27, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2015/07/legal-rights-lgbt-discrimination-religious-freedom-claims/399278/; John Yoo, Judicial 
Supremacy Has Its Limits, NAT’L REV. (July 6, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview. 
com/article/420810/ obergefell-judicial-supremacy. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/10
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the potential to cause a host of unexpected, and sometimes negative, 
consequences for the property rights of gay spouses—problems that 
legislatures and courts may soon find themselves forced to confront.  
I. RETROACTIVITY AND VESTED RIGHTS 
Perhaps one of the most significant questions in the wake of Obergefell 
is the impact of the apparent retroactivity of the Court’s decision. As in 
many other instances in which the high court has struck down a law as 
violative of a protected right, if a right exists under the Constitution, then 
it has always existed.
3
 If a law is unconstitutional, it has always been 
unconstitutional, and retroactive application is appropriate.
4
  
The issue of retroactivity of constitutional law decisions—that is, 
whether the effects of a pronouncement by the court should be applied to 
facts arising before the decision—has had quite a stormy history in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
5
 Justice Scalia,
6
 for example, has advocated 
for a strict retroactivity approach to constitutional decisions, but other 
Justices, from Justice O’Connor7 to Justice Frankfurter,8 have advanced 
the view that common sense considerations demand a more flexible 
approach that might often lead to selective prospectivity. Nevertheless, 
 
 
 3. See generally James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted) (“[The judicial power is the ability] ‘to say what the law is’ . . . not the 
power to change it.”); see also Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (“When this 
Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of 
federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all 
events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.”); Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 168–70 (1990). 
 4. See Peg Quann, Bucks County Judge Rules Same-Sex Widow Entitled to Benefits, 
INTELLIGENCER (July 29, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://www.theintell.com/news/local/bucks-county-judge-
rules-same-sex-widow-entitled-to-benefits/article_abf34af5-01ee-523c-b3b4-c73c5efad959.html 
(discussing an opinion dealing with the retroactive application of a same-sex common law marriage in 
Pennsylvania and consequential conferral of disability benefits upon the surviving spouse beneficiary); 
see also Order, Hard v. Strange, No. 2:13-CV-922-WKW (M.D. Ala. July 29, 2015), ECF No. 96 
(dealing with same-sex marriage retroactivity relative to rights to wrongful death-benefits in 
Alabama). 
 5. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1:9 (3d ed. 2014) (analyzing 
the progression of the retroactivity debate in Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
 6. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 548–49 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing 
that it is beyond the power of the Court to apply decisions on a purely or even only selectively 
prospective basis, which is due to the long-standing theory that the Supreme Court can only proclaim 
what the law already is and cannot create new law). 
 7. See, e.g., Harper, 509 U.S. at 117 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Such a rule is both contrary to 
established precedent and at odds with any notion of fairness or sound decisional practice.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is much 
more conducive to law’s self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective 
content to a new pronouncement of law.”). 
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recent case law has indicated a trend toward more retroactivity, even in the 
face of efforts by Congress to change such results.
9
  
Under strict retroactivity theory, then, gay couples validly married 
under the laws of one state, but domiciled in a non-recognition state, have 
been living under a marital property regime from the date of their 
marriage. This means that many of the acts these individuals may have 
taken with respect to property must now satisfy a multitude of legal rules 
that were most assuredly not anticipated by the parties at the time of the 
transaction. For instance, in community property states, the law generally 
requires that both spouses consent for community real property to be sold, 
mortgaged, or otherwise transferred.
10
 However, if the marriage of a seller 
of real property was not recognized at the time of the transfer, it is a virtual 
certainty that this dual consent was not obtained. The retroactive 
application of Obergefell seriously calls into question the validity of such 
transactions. 
Judging from decisions by the federal government
11
 and various 
states
12
 in allowing gay couples to recapture benefits lost prior to marital 
recognition, retroactivity certainly seems to be the rule for gay marriage. 
To that end, a number of issues arise in this context. How will the rights of 
third parties be affected by the marital property implications of the Court’s 
ruling? Moreover, will legislatures craft transition laws that allow gay 
spouses to avoid certain marital property institutions, as heterosexual 
spouses are allowed to do by contract prior to or at the onset of their 
marriages? Or will legislatures pass laws designed to protect the rights of 
innocent third parties and their settled expectations? And will states be 
limited in their ability to take any such actions given the risk of 
deprivation of a spouse’s constitutionally protected interest in newly 
 
 
 9. See, e.g., 1 RICH, supra note 5, § 1:9 (explaining Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 
211, 240 (1995), where the Court invalidated an attempt by Congress to revive the potential for certain 
securities litigation when the Court had, in a prior case, upheld a truncated statute of limitations for 
securities fraud). 
 10. See, e.g., Reimann v. United States, 315 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1963); In re Marriage of 
Brooks, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 624, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), abrogated by In re Marriage of Valli, 324 P.3d 
274 (Cal. 2014); Lovelass v. Sword, 90 P.3d 330, 333 (Idaho 2004); Bridges v. Bridges, 692 So. 2d 
1186, 1194–95 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Treadwell v. Henderson, 269 P.2d 1108, 1116 (N.M. 1954); 
Rustad v. Rustad, 377 P.2d 414, 416 (Wash. 1963). 
 11. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201 (providing a mechanism for the retroactive 
recapturing of lost tax benefits). 
 12. See, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 95 A.3d 1011, 1030 (Conn. 2014) (citing Marone v. Waterbury, 
707 A.2d 725 (Conn. 1998) (holding that “judgments that are not by their terms limited to prospective 
application are presumed to apply retroactively to pending cases”)); see also supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/10
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reckoned marital property? These issues are far from simple and resist an 
easy solution—both for states and the federal courts. 
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS AFTER OBERGEFELL: THE MARITAL PROPERTY 
REGIMES 
If Obergefell is ultimately given retroactive effect, it will result in the 
automatic vesting of property rights across the patrimonies of both 
spouses. What was once property owned and controlled by just one of the 
spouses will now become subject to the rights of another spouse, and to a 
number of third parties.  
Up until now, many gay couples across the United States were unable 
to avail themselves of the marital property regimes that opposite-sex 
spouses so frequently take for granted. Indeed, gay couples very often 
engaged in a great deal of property and estate planning maneuvers that 
would normally be relegated to only the wealthiest and most sophisticated 
of couples so as to work around the unavailability of default marital 
property rules. It has been quite common for gay couples, who heretofore 
could not wed, to execute various legal documents ranging from wills and 
powers-of-attorney to various trust and corporate instruments in order to 
effectuate a marriage-like regime.
13
 These couples—married by all 
outward appearances—were required to engage in a complicated and 
expensive series of legal transactions in order to ensure that their rights 
and duties vis-à-vis each other were arranged so as to give legal effect to 
their non-legal union.
14
  
Because of the probing analysis in which gay couples were forced to 
engage in order to undertake these legal transactions, they made decisions 
that diverged from what the normal marital property rules might otherwise 
provide. Indeed, a wealthy partner might prefer that the couple not be 
subjected to community property or to spousal support obligations in the 
event of a split. Similarly, an individual who might enjoy the benefits of 
supplemental security or other welfare programs might desire to avoid 
having his assets combined with those of his partner, lest he be 
disqualified from government assistance. Due to the gay couple’s inability 
 
 
 13. See Tara Siegel Bernard, What Gay Unions Don’t Guarantee, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/01/business/yourmoney/01couples.html?referer=; see also Tara 
Siegel Bernard & Ron Lieber, The High Price of Being a Gay Couple, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/your-money/03money.html. 
 14. Such transactions ranged from ensuring that property was inherited by the surviving partner 
to guaranteeing that medical decision-making authority did not fall to a third party. See sources cited 
supra note 13. 
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to avail themselves of the marital property regimes of their home states, 
careful and often surprisingly complex planning often became an inherent 
part of many gay relationships.
15
 
But now gay couples, who were married under the laws of one state but 
live in a state that had not recognized their union, will likely be surprised 
to find that some or all of their legal arrangements are rendered less 
effective or even void. Indeed, there are issues that arise in the context of 
marital property when it comes to equitable distribution that might diverge 
a great deal from the desires and expectations of many gay couples. For 
instance, in at least some states, educational degrees and professional 
licenses are considered to be marital property and thus subject to valuation 
and distribution upon termination of the marriage.
16
 Moreover, the marital 
property law of many states allows a spouse to select either to take 
whatever is devised by the decedent spouse under a will, or instead select a 
statutorily set share—usually around one-half—of all the property that a 
decedent spouse owned at the time of death.
17
 As a result, for a spouse 
who had carefully engaged in the process of will-making, it might come as 
quite an unexpected surprise to learn that her wishes could be so easily set 
aside. 
The law of community property, which operates in nine states, presents 
additional complexities.
18
 Community property law is based on the notion 
that married persons participate as an economic unit to which each makes 
valuable contributions.
19
 Under this theory, ownership, acquisition, 
disposition, management, and control over the property of the spouses 
become subject to a strict set of rules.
20
 The mixing of community 
 
 
 15. See generally Deborah L. Jacobs, Married, With Complications, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2011, 6:00 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0822/investing-same-sex-marriage-legal-rights-married-
complications.html (describing the documentation and planning that often accompanied gay 
relationships prior to Obergefell). 
 16. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(7) (McKinney 2015); see also O’Brien v. 
O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 745–46 (N.Y. 1985); Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902–03 (App. Div. 
1991). 
 17. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(a) (amended 2010). 
 18. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. 
REV. 1227, 1234 n.19 (citations omitted) (“These states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. The first eight states have been community 
property states since they achieved statehood, reflecting their French or Spanish heritage. Wisconsin 
adopted the community property approach in 1984 when it adopted the Uniform Marital Property 
Act.”). 
 19. Deborah H. Bell, Equitable Distribution: Implementing the Marital Partnership Theory 
Through the Dual Classification System, 67 MISS. L.J. 115, 120–21 (1997). 
 20. See generally J. Thomas Oldham, Management of the Community Estate During an Intact 
Marriage, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 100 (1993) (describing the differences in the spousal 
management structures between the traditional common law and community property marital 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/10
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property with separate property, for example, can be particularly 
complicated. One of the spouses might have purchased a home prior to the 
marriage using a mortgage loan. Once married, that spouse’s earnings 
constitute community property, and the home, once considered separate 
property, can either suddenly become community property or trigger a 
number of reimbursement rights when community earnings are used to 
pay the mortgage loan.
21
 In the context of gay spouses living in a non-
recognition state prior to Obergefell, the use of what were considered 
separate funds at the time—now retroactively community funds—can 
have a significant effect on the other spouse’s rights. Both unexpected and 
undesired outcomes are likely to result. 
III. THIRD PARTY RIGHTS AND THE UNSETTLING OF SETTLED 
EXPECTATIONS 
Although the Court’s decision has significant effects on the rights of 
the spouses themselves, there are serious implications for the rights of 
third parties (i.e., those who deal or enter into transactions with either of 
the spouses) as well. In particular, the problem hits hard for those spouses 
living in community property states. For instance, one spouse might 
purchase a piece of real estate that would be considered community 
property if his state of domicile recognized his same-sex marriage, but at 
the time (before the Obergefell ruling) was instead considered separate 
property. Then, that spouse might donate or sell the property to a third 
party. If Obergefell is to be given full retroactive effect, the property was 
(albeit retroactively) a community asset. And, as such, the alienation of the 
property may well have required the consent of the other spouse.
22
 In fact, 
some state laws allow the non-consenting spouse to void a transfer of real 
estate without concurrence after the fact.
23
  
What is the impact of this on the donee or the buyer of the property? It 
was certainly within the settled expectations of the parties that the 
 
 
regimes); see also James W. Paulsen, The Unsecured Texas Creditor’s Post-Divorce Claim to Former 
Community Property, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 781, 786–88 (2011) (describing the classifications of 
community property and the management rules governing those categories). 
 21. See Stewart W. Gagnon & Christina H. Patierno, Reimbursement & Tracing: The Bread and 
Butter to a Gourmet Family Law Property Case, 49 BAYLOR. L. REV. 323, 337–38 (1997) (discussing 
the reimbursement theory); see also Kimberly D. Higginbotham, Comment, Reimbursement for 
Satisfaction of Community Obligations with Separate Property: Getting What’s Yours, 68 LA. L. REV. 
181, 184 n.16 (2007) (discussing the buy-into-title theory). 
 22. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1102 (West 2015); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2347 (2015); TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.102 (2015). 
 23. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2353 (2015). 
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transaction was valid, and indeed the transferor at the time of the transfer 
was technically not married. But now, the retroactive vesting of 
community property rights in the real estate in favor of the other spouse 
threatens to seriously undermine these expectations and potentially upset 
the rights of third parties. Moreover, these third party rights may also be 
due constitutional protection, thereby creating a tension between 
competing constitutional rights. Retroactively granting the spouse a 
community property interest in the asset and thereby giving him a right to 
rescind the transaction for which he did not consent, for instance, 
necessarily means that the third party who acquired rights to the property 
(such as a buyer) is being deprived of his interest. The question arises, 
then, how the law should balance the settled expectations of the buyer in 
the finality of his purchase of the property and the societal policy of 
honoring the newly reckoned community interests of a spouse. 
The same questions arise in the case of the buyer-spouse encumbering 
the property with a mortgage or granting an easement to a neighbor in a 
community property state. At the time of the granting of these rights, the 
law of the states not recognizing same-sex marriages almost assuredly 
afforded unilateral authority to the grantor-spouse to take such actions 
alone. However, if indeed Obergefell is to be given retroactive effect, then 
this property is now, and has been since acquisition, subject to community 
property rules. The granting of the easement and the imposition of the 
mortgage likely required the consent of the other spouse and that lack of 
dual consent could be fatal. But, without delving into the intimacies and 
personal details of the life of the grantor (such as by questioning the 
grantor as to his relationship status and ascertaining whether a would-be 
community property regime might be in the offing due to a case like 
Obergefell), how would a grantee know whether a possible marital 
property regime was lying in wait at the time of the transaction? 
IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND THE RIGHTS OF CREDITORS 
If marital property rules were to be imposed on gay spouses 
retroactively, a significant portion of those affected would likely find 
themselves dissatisfied. Most of us think of the application of marital 
property rules as a natural consequence that flows from the perfection of 
the marital union, and we assume that marital property rules are intuitive, 
equitable, and reflect a default law that most couples would select had they 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss3/10
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given significant thought to the question.
24
 In fact, they are anything but. 
When it comes to spouses’ interaction with creditors, in particular, 
American marital property regimes can be particularly undesirable.
25
 And 
for those spouses who assumed they would not be governed by marital 
property laws, the effects can be quite unexpected. 
In the states governed by separate property regimes, marriage has only 
minor effects when it comes to the property available for seizure by the 
creditors of one of the spouses. Creditors seize the property of their 
debtors alone and, with a few narrow exceptions, marriage does not affect 
the creditor’s position.26 Not so for the roughly 30% of the American 
population governed by regimes of community property.
27
 In these states, 
creditors have heavily increased access to seizable property simply 
because their debtors make the choice to marry.
28
 The effect is so extreme 
that the community property regime has been described as a creditor 
collection device.
29
 
For debts incurred during an existing marriage, most community 
property states provide for the seizure not only of the debtor spouse’s 
property, but also of the couple’s community property, even if that 
property is acquired by the non-debtor spouse.
30
 The result is a sheer 
windfall to creditors; lending to married persons in a community property 
jurisdiction gives the creditor access to vastly greater stores of property 
than that which would be available when a debt is incurred by an 
unmarried individual. Worse still, in some of these states, even the 
premarital debts of one spouse can be satisfied from the entirety of the 
community property, including the non-debtor spouse’s wages.31 The 
marriage of a debtor spouse domiciled in a community property regime is 
 
 
 24. See generally Lawrence Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Critique of Consent Theory, 54 
MONT. L. REV. 169, 176–78 (1993) (describing the purpose of default rules in contract, in part as 
being designed to be simple, efficient, and similar to what the parties would have chosen themselves). 
 25. See generally Andrea B. Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the Community 
Property Regime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor Collection Device?, 47 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1, 3–8 (2007) (describing community property law’s strong bent in favor of creditors). 
 26. Id. at 4. 
 27. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIV., ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT 
POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 
1, 2014 tbl.1 (2014), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/totals/2014/tables/NST-
EST2014-01.xls. As of the 2010 Census, the total US population was 308,745,538. Id. Of that number, 
92,063,744 individuals reside in one of the nine community property states. 
 28. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 25, at 4. 
 29. Id. at 3. 
 30. Id. at 9–20. 
 31. Id. at 4–9. 
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nothing short of a dream for creditors. Of course, it can be a nightmare for 
the spouses themselves. 
It has been well-accepted for decades now that prospective spouses 
know relatively little about the default marital property rules that will 
ultimately govern their marriage.
32
 Few individuals would likely wish, for 
instance, to have their wages garnished for their spouses’ premarital credit 
card debt. Yet this is precisely the case in some community property 
states.  
Savvy heterosexual couples have long had the ability to reject the 
application of such undesirable consequences by matrimonial agreement. 
After all, default marital property rules should be just that—rules that 
apply in the absence of any agreement between the parties. The trouble is 
that same-sex spouses who perfected a valid marriage in advance of 
Obergefell, and who are domiciled in a non-recognition state, simply had 
no equivalent opportunity. The vehicle through which couples renounce 
marital property regimes—namely, matrimonial agreements—was not 
available to them. And even if it were, same-sex couples certainly could 
not be saddled with the burden of having to execute a null contract, 
anticipating that a decision like Obergefell would one day be rendered that 
might give that contract effect. Parties to a same-sex marriage perfected in 
advance of Obergefell but living in a non-recognition state, then, simply 
did not have opportunities equivalent to those afforded to heterosexual 
couples to opt out of the default marital property regime. 
In that light, the creditor-friendly effects of many marital property 
regimes become all the more offensive. And if Obergefell is ultimately 
given retroactive effect, the consequences for many gay couples—who 
would suffer substantially increased liability for their partners’ debts, 
without fair warning—would be very troubling. 
CONCLUSION 
In these and other contexts, questions arise as to the extent to which 
gay spouses—who were legally married before Obergefell was decided 
but living in a non-recognition state—will be retroactively governed by 
marital property rules. Will they have a choice as to whether those rules 
govern, or will these sometimes odd and even undesired effects be foisted 
on them as a matter of law? A great deal remains to be decided and—with 
some states only begrudgingly complying with the Court’s decision (and 
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often under great protest)—one wonders how eager state lawmakers will 
be to address these issues.
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